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State Responsibility for Gender Stereotyping
BarbaraStark*
"Certainly the Constitution does not require discrimination on the basis of
sex. The only issue is whether it prohibits it. It doesn't."
- Justice Antonin Scalial
I. INTRODUCTION

Scholars have recently re-discovered Justice Ruth Bader Ginburg's
early anti-stereotyping work.2 As Cary Franklin notes, Justice Ginsburg's
approach "was grounded not in a commitment to eradicating sex
classifications from the law, but in a far richer theory of equal protection
involving constitutional limitations on the state's power to enforce sex-role
stereotypes." 3 Some of these scholars believe that this approach holds great
promise for issues at the "frontiers of equal protection law" such as samesex marriage and the work-family conflict.4 As Ginsburg herself has come to

* OBarbara Stark. Professor of Law, Research Fellow, and Associate Dean for Intellectual Life,
Hofstra Law School. Early versions of this Article were presented at the University of Pennsylvania
School of Law, Washington College of Law, Columbia Law School, Duke Law School, the Law &
Society Annual Meeting, the AALS Midyear Meeting on Gender Equality, and as the Hofstra
Distinguished Faculty Lecture. I am deeply grateful to the organizers and participants, especially
Marina Angel, Pamela Bridgewater, Steven Costenoble, Brenda Cossman, Leon Friedman, Liz
Glazer, Joanna Grossman, Janet Halley, Grant Hayden, Linda McClain, and Anne Shalleck; to
Hofstra University and Hofstra Law School for generous support; to reference librarian Patricia
Kasting; to the American Society of International Law and its Executive Director, Elizabeth
Anderson; and to Clara Brillembourg and Kristine Huskey, Co-Chairs of the Women in International
Law Interest Group, for appointing me to the Society's observer delegation to the CEDAW sessions
at the UN in July 2012; to research assistants Mitsu Chevalier and Sophia Eckhert; and to Joyce Cox
for her skill and patience in preparing the manuscript.
1.
Amanda Terkel, Scalia: Women Don't Have Constitutional Protection Against
Discrimination, HUFF POST POL. (May 25, 2011), www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/03/scaliawomen-discrimination-constitution n 803813.html.
2.
Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on
Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex Discrimination,59 DUKE L.J. 771 (2010) (citing Ginsburg's brief
on behalf of a pregnant service woman in a case that was settled); see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A
Postscript to Struck by Stereotype, 59 DUKE L.J. 799, 800 (2010) (noting that "[t]he authors have
captured just what was on my mind and in my heart"); Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping
Principlein ConstitutionalSex DiscriminationLaw, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010).
3.

Franklin, supra note 2, at 83.

4.
Id. at 91. Others are less sanguine. See, e.g., Julie Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Badfor
Women? Rethinking AntidiscriminationLaw and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 39
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realize, however, anti-stereotyping is only the beginning. 5 This Article
explains why anti-stereotyping is insufficient, what else is needed, and why
the Constitution cannot be relied upon to provide it.
Part I explains how gender stereotypes originate and are perpetuated;
that is, how gender is reproduced. It also sets out the consequences-for
men, for women, and for the societies in which they live. Part II explains
why barring the state from enforcing sex-role stereotypes is inadequate; it
allows the most pernicious stereotypes to flourish. It also explains why this
is not surprising.
Part III explains why the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women 6 (CEDAW or Women's Convention) is
far more promising. The Article concludes that CEDAW's bar on
stereotyping is not only better for women than the Constitution's grant of
equal protection, but better for men as well.
For the first time in United States history, there are more women than
men in the labor force. 7 Roughly twenty percent of men of prime working
age are unemployed, the highest rate ever recorded. 8 These demographics
are part of a larger "economic and cultural power shift from men to women"
documented in a recent influential article, The End ofMen. 9 This shift makes
gender equality an increasingly clear imperative-especially, as Ginsburg

(2010) (arguing that generous family leave policies in Europe result in a weaker labor force
attachment for European women).
5. See infra Part II.C.; David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The DecliningInfluence of the United
States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762, 764 (2012) (quoting Ginsburg: "I would not look to the
U.S. Constitution if I were drafting a constitution in the year 2012."). Ginsburg suggests that the
South African Constitution, Canadian Charter, or the European Convention on Human Rights might
be more useful as models. Id Adam Liptak, 'We the People'LosesAppeal With People Around the
World, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/07/us/we-the-people-losesappeal-with-people-around-the-world.html?_r-0. All three instruments expressly assure gender
equality and positive rights. JEANNE M. WOODS & HOPE LEWIS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE GLOBAL
MARKETPLACE: ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL DIMENSIONS 726-80 (2005) (South African

Constitution); id at 781-840 (European Convention); id. at 254-62 (Canadian Charter). See infra
text accompanying note 46 (explaining how the lack of these two features, among others, makes the
U.S. Constitution an outlier).
6.
G.A. Res. 34/180, Part 1,art. 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES, 34/180 [hereinafter CEDAW] (entered
into force Sept. 3, 1981). President Jimmy Carter signed CEDAW in 1978. As a signatory, under
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the United States must refrain from any
action that would "defeat the object and purpose of a treaty." 1946-1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336,
available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-1-18232English.pdf.
7.
Catherine Rampell, Women Now a Majority in American Workplaces, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6,
2010), www.nytimes.com/2010/ 02/06/business/economy/06women.html; Hanna Rosin, The End of
Men, ATLANTIC, July/Aug. 2010, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/07/the-end-of-men/
308135/.
8.

Rosin, supra note 7.

9.

Id.
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insisted forty years ago, for American men.
II. THE REPRODUCTION OF GENDER

This Part explains how gender is reproduced and why it matters.
Section A explains where gender stereotypes come from and how they are
replicated. Section B describes how this dynamic plays out in the global
economy. Section C focuses on its effects in the United States.
A. The Sexual Division ofLabor

Historian Gerda Lerner, among others, identifies the "sexual division of
labor based on biological differences" 10 as the bedrock for women's
subordination. 1 As anthropologist Gayle Rubin notes, the sexual division of
labor based on biological differences appears in "endless variety and
monotonous similarity, cross-culturally and throughout history."' 2 As she
explains:
Although every society has some sort of division of tasks by sex,
the assignment of any particular task to one sex or the other varies
enormously ... [the purpose] is to insure the union of men and
women by making the smallest viable economic unit contain at
least one man and one woman. The division of labor by sex can
therefore be seen as a "taboo": a taboo against the sameness of men
and women, a taboo dividing the sexes into two mutually exclusive
categories, a taboo which exacerbates the biological differences
between the sexes and thereby creates gender.13
The innumerable iterations of the sexual division of labor are grounded
in stereotypes of women as reproductive workers and men as productive

10.

GERDA LERNER, THE CREATION OF PATRIARCHY 16-17 (1986).

I1.
See, e.g., Alison M. Jaggar, Globalizing Feminist Ethics, in DECENTERING THE CENTER:
PHILOSOPHY FOR A MULTICULTURAL, POSTCOLONIAL AND FEMINIST WORLD 1, 13 (Uma Narayan &
Sandra Harding eds., 2000) (noting consensus among feminists in the developing world that "the
abolition of the sexual division of labor" is necessary to overcome women's subordination); Gayle
Rubin, The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy" of Sex, in FEMINIST
ANTHROPOLOGY: A READER 87, 90 (Ellen Lewin ed., 2006) (drawing on Claude livi-Strauss,
Sigmund Freud, and Jacques Lacan to develop a theory of "a sex/gender system," found in every
society, consisting of "a set of arrangements by which the biological raw material of human sex and
procreation is shaped by human, social intervention"). But see Arvonne S. Fraser, Becoming Human:
The Origins and Development of Women's Human Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q. 853, 899 (1999) (noting
different views regarding the "roots of [gender] inequality" among the less developed countries, the
western industrialized states, and the Soviet bloc).
12.

Rubin, supra note 11, at 88.

13.

Id. at94.
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workers. 14 This includes the "female-as-caregiver" and "male-asrightsholder" stereotypes described by Aristotle. 15 In his polis, men alone
were citizens, and therefore rightsholders. Women's job was to reproduce
male citizens, by raising them as well as quite literally giving birth to them.
"Raising citizens" involves a range of caregiving tasks, including feeding,
bathing, clothing, and protecting children, which may be understood as
reproductive work. Although these tasks are not necessarily linked to
reproduction, Aristotle considered women's responsibility for this work to
be "natural." 1 6 "Rightsholders" were male-never pregnant, never
breastfeeding-and "caregivers" were female-always subject to the endless
demands of caregiving, even if not actually pregnant or breastfeeding.
The reproduction of gender extends beyond the sexual division of
labor to stereotypes unrelated to it, but which nevertheless signal gender in a
particular culture. In the United States, dressing babies in pink, for example,
signals that they are girls. 17 The reproduction of gender is both internalized

14.
Other theories for the origins of gender roles include economist Ester Boserup's notion
that gender roles can be traced back to early farming practices. A recent paper, for example, suggests
that gender roles originated in a "fundamental" technological change in food production; i.e., the
adoption of the plough, which demanded greater upper body strength than hoes. Once ploughs were
used, men had an advantage. See Alberto Alesina et al., On the Origins of Gender Roles: Women
and the Plough, 128 Q.J. ECON. 469 (2013); The Plough and The Now, ECONOMIST, July 23, 2011,
at 74, available at http://www.economist.com/node/18986073.
15.
See generally D. BRENDAN NAGLE, THE HOUSEHOLD AS THE FOUNDATION OF
ARISTOTLE'S POLIS (2006); THE SEXISM OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY: WOMEN AND
REPRODUCTION FROM PLATO TO NIETZSCHE vi-ix (Lorenne M.G. Clarke & Lynda Lange eds.,

1979). Jack Balkin puts this in a contemporary context:
[T]he lower status of women in society has largely been achieved through role
differentiation, which has been justified by paternalism and appeals to nature and
biological differences. The inequality of women in our society has been maintained by
ensuring that they are remitted to traditional occupations of home and family and by
denying them opportunities beyond those activities socially marked as "women's
work."
Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade: An Engine of Controversy, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE
SAID 45 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).

16. NAGLE, supra note 15, at 85. Recent studies question this link. See, e.g., Pam Belluck,
FatherhoodCuts Testosterone, Study Finds, For Good of the Family, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2011, at
Al (citing "the first large study measuring testosterone in men when they were single and childless
and several years after they had children" which found that "[t]estosterone, that most male of
hormones, takes a dive after a man becomes a parent. And the more he gets involved in caring for
his children-changing diapers, jiggling the boy or girl on his knee, reading 'Goodnight Moon' for
the umpteenth time-the lower his testosterone drops."); see also Alex Williams, Fathers and the
XX-Factor, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2011, at STI (describing fathers' reactions to this news).

17.
See, e.g., Jeanne Maglaty, When Did Girls Start Wearing Pink? SMITHSONIAN (Apr. 8,
2011),
http://www.smithsonianmag.con-i/arts-culture/when-did-girls-start-wearing-pink- 1370097/
(observing that "today's color dictate wasn't established until the 1940s"). Jo B. PAOLETrTI, PINK
AND BLUE: TELLING THE GIRLS FROM THE BOYS IN AMERICA (2012) (describing historical trends,

including the relatively recent fashion of indicating an infant's sex with pink or blue).
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and overdetermined. 18 It is reflected in, and reinforced by, redundant
social, 19 economic, 20 cultural, 2 1 religious, 22 and legal norms. 2 3 The
reproduction of gender shapes the U.S. economy, in part simply by
determining what counts as "work," as explained below. In the process of
doing so, it perpetuates itself, reproducing gender in ever-shifting forms.

Carolyn Heilbrun explained to a class on Women & the Law at Columbia Law School in 1989 that
baby girls can wear blue, but baby boys can't wear pink because it would be degrading. But times
may be changing. See, e.g., Andrea Canning & Maureen White, For Young Boys, Is Pink the New
Blue? (ABC News television broadcast July 18, 2011) (noting that "pink is in").
18.

There is a vast literature on the internalization and overdetermination of gender.

Noteworthy examples include: IRIS MARION YOUNG, THROWING LIKE A GIRL (2005); NANCY
CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING (1989); DOROTHY DINNERSTEIN, THE MERMAID

AND THE MINOTAUR (1976); See also Katherine Bartlett, Pregnancy and The Constitution: The
Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1532, 1564 (1974) (noting that "sex roles today are more
deeply entrenched than race roles; it is still acceptable, after all, to teach sex roles at home and in
school, long after instruction in racial bias has gone underground"). The author, of course, was
writing in 1974.
19.

Social norms include the expectation that mothers, more than fathers, will take care of

small children. See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 309

(2003) (noting "the 'gender codes' that put pressure on women to become mothers, to keep and raise
their children, and to subordinate their professional and personal interests for family have not
disappeared"); Keith Cunningham, Note, Father Time: Flexible Work Arrangements and the Law
Firm's Failureof the Family, 53 STAN. L. REV. 967 (2001); Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental
Leave, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1048 (1994) (explaining social barriers restricting paternal participation in
caregiving, including stereotypes of men as "breadwinners"); Christen Linke Young, Note,
Childbearing, Childrearing, and Title VII: Parental Leave Policies at Large American Law Firms,
118 YALE L.J. 1182 (2009).
20.

See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND

WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (2000) (explaining how the structure of market work disadvantages
caregivers); Felice Schwartz, Management Women and the New Facts of Life, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Jan-Feb. 1989, at 65 (arguing in favor of a "mommy track" to enable women to combine
motherhood and careers).
21.
See, e.g., Katha Politt, Whose Culture?, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 27
(Susan Moller Okin et al. eds., 1999) ("In its demand for equality for women, feminism sets itself in
opposition to virtually every culture on earth. You could say that multiculturalism demands respect
for all cultural traditions, while feminism interrogates and challenges all cultural traditions."). This
includes legal culture. See LANI GUINIER ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL

AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1997) (explaining how gender is reproduced in law schools).
22.

See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Should Sex Equality Law Apply to Religious Institutions?, in

IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 85 (Susan Moller Okin et al. eds., 1999); Sherry F. Colb,

To Whom Do We Refer When We Speak of Obligations to "Future Generations"? Reproductive
Rights and the Intergenerational Community, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1582, 1587 (2009) (noting
religious restrictions on birth control).
23.
See, e.g., HILARY CHARLESWORTH & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 233-44 (2000) (explaining why "human rights" are "men's rights"); Joan
Williams & Nancy Siegal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for Family Caregivers Who Are
DiscriminatedAgainst on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 77 (2003) (describing varying forms of
workplace discrimination).
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B. How This Plays Out

As the CEDAW Committee observes, "[p]ublic and private spheres of
human activity have always been considered distinct, and have been
regulated accordingly. Invariably, women have been assigned to the private
or domestic sphere, associated with reproduction and the raising of children,
and in all societies these activities have been treated as inferior." 24 These
activities, moreover, have been ignored-as Marilyn Waring and others
show, women's work has historically been economically invisible; it has not
appeared in national statistics. 25
A 2011 study based on detailed time-use surveys for 26 Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member countries and
three emerging economies reveals that, "between one-third and half of all
valuable economic activity ... is not accounted for in the traditional
measures of well-being, such as GDP per capita. In all countries, women do
more of such work than men." 2 6 Women everywhere do all or most of the
childcare;27 they clean and maintain the family home; 28 they prepare the
family's food;29 and they nurse family members when they become sick.30
Even when women work outside the home, they continue to perform far
more of this work than men. 3 1
24.
U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), Gen. Recommendation No. 23: Political & Public Life, 1 8, U.N. Doc. A/52/38 (1997),
available at http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm.
The
Committee concludes, "[b]y contrast, public life, which is respected and honoured, extends to a
broad range of activity outside the private and domestic sphere. Men historically have both
dominated public life and exercised the power to confine and subordinate women within the private
sphere." Id.
25.
MARILYN WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTED 74-91 (1988). See also MARILYN WARING,
THREE MASQUERADES: ESSAYS ON EQUALITY, WORK AND HU(MAN) RIGHTS 58 (1996). For a
detailed description of women's global economic subordination, see CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN,
supra note 23, at 4-14.
26.
Veerle Miranda, Cooking, Caring and Volunteering: Unpaid Work Around the World,
OECD Soc., EMP. & MIGRATION WORKING PAPERS 4 (Mar. 3, 2011), available at
http://www.oecd.org/berlin/47258230.pdf.
27.
Id at 16-20 (noting that not only do women spend substantially more time on childcare
than men, but that, "non-working fathers still devote less time to childcare than working mothers in
nearly all surveyed countries (except in Hungary and the United States)"). In the United States, the
non-working fathers spend 95 minutes per day on childcare, while working women spend 94
minutes per day on childcare. Id. at 19.
28.
"In all countries the main component of unpaid work is routine housework" averaging 2
hours and 8 minutes per day. Id. at 15.
29.
"82% of women prepare meals on an average day, while only 44% of men do. Also, the
average time spent by women on cooking is four times the time spent by men." Id. at 25.
30.

Id. at 20-21.

31.

Id. at 13-14 (noting that, "[w]hile women have traditionally been responsible for
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Because of the demands of their unpaid work, in part, most women who
work outside of the home work in lower-paid "female" occupations.32 Like
the sexual division of labor within the family, the association of particular
occupations with one sex or the other varies among countries and over time.
The constant is that women are paid less. While women's participation in the
paid workforce has increased, according to the U.N. Division of Statistics,
"[h]orizontal and vertical job segregation has resulted in a persistent gender
pay gap everywhere." 33 In the United States, "[t]he typical woman who
worked full-time, year-round in 2010 still made only 77 cents for each dollar
earned by her male counterpart-a figure that has barely moved in more
than a decade." 34 The poverty rate among women rose to 14.5 percent in
2010, the highest rate in 17 years. 35 Women living in "extreme poverty"i.e., women whose income was less than half of the federal poverty linerose to 6.3 percent, or 7.5 million women, in 2010, the highest ever
recorded.36
By impoverishing women, the sexual division of labor impoverishes the
families and communities in which they live. As set out in a recent World
Bank report, women are less likely to spend money on alcohol or other
forms of entertainment for themselves and more likely to spend it in ways
that benefit their families and communities. 3 7 As a recent OECD study
measuring the economic and political power of women in 162 countries
concluded, "the greater the power of women, the greater the country's

housework and caring, they have become increasingly active in the paid labour market over the past
few decades and have decreased their unpaid working time. . . . Yet, even in the country with the
highest average unpaid working time among men-Denmark-men still devote less time to unpaid
work than women in Norway, the country with the lowest female unpaid working time." (citations
omitted)). See also U.N. Dep't of Econ & Soc. Affairs, The World's Women 2010: Trends and
Statistics, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.K/19 (2010) [hereinafter World's Women], available at
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/Worldswomen/WW-full%20report color.pdf
(noting tables of time spent on paid and unpaid work, indicating that women everywhere perform
more of the latter than men).
32.

CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 23, at 6.

33.

World's Women, supra note 31, at ix.

34. Analysis of New 2010 Census Poverty Data, NAT'L WOMEN'S L. CTR., http://www.nwlc.
org/analysis-new-2010-census-poverty-data-%E2%80%93-september-2011
[hereinafter NWLC]
(last updated Sept. 22, 2011).
35.

Id. (showing that the men's poverty rate was lower, rising to only 11.2%).

36.
Leslie Bennetts, Women: The Invisible Poor, DAILY BEAST (Sept. 14, 2011, 12:11 PM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/09/14/u-s-women-hit-hardest-by-poverty-says-censusreport.html.
37.
World Bank, The World Bank and Gender Equality: At a Glance (Nov. 11, 2011),
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2011/04/1 I/the-world-bank-and-gender-equality-at-aglance [hereinafter World Bank, Gender Equality] (noting further that, "[tlhis could be one reason
why countries with greater gender equality tend to have lower poverty rates").
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economic success." 38
C. In the United States

While gender is reproduced in the United States, as it is everywhere
else, it looks different here. 39 These differences are grounded in the peculiar
American antipathy to economic rights. The United States is the only
40
industrialized state that does not recognize basic economic rights,
including the right to "special protection [for] mothers during a reasonable
period before and after childbirth'A and the right to health.42 As David Law
and Mila Versteeg note in the N. Y U. Law Review, the failure of the United
States Constitution to assure economic rights, along with its failure to
explicitly assure women's rights, make it a global outlier. 43
1. Pregnancy and Childcare
Like women everywhere, women in the United States do most of the
childcare, housework, and general caregiving work.4 4 Twenty years ago,
Arlie Hochschild and Anne Machung described "the second shift" worked
by employed women in the home, amounting to an extra month's work each
year compared to their husbands. 4 5 As sociologist Suzanne Bianchi and her
colleagues have recently shown, the second shift persists, albeit in altered
forms-"[f]athers' increased child care seems to have accelerated
particularly in the 1990s .... [but] [m]others still shoulder twice as much
child care and housework.,46

38.

Rosin, supranote 7, at 4.

39.
These differences also support the argument, set out above, that gender stereotypes and
the sexual division of labor are constructed, rather than innate. See supra Part II.A.
See generally Barbara Stark, At Last? Ratification of the Economic Covenant as a
40.
Congressional-Executive Agreement, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (2011)
[hereinafter Economic Covenant] (arguing that the United States should ratify the International

Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 4).
41.

Economic Covenant, supranote 40, at art. 10.

42.

Id. at art. 12.

Law & Versteeg, supra note 5, at 806-07 (noting that "[t]he U.S. Constitution is, instead,
43.
rooted in a libertarian constitutional tradition that is inherently antithetical to the notion of positive
rights").
44. See Nadine Taub, From ParentalLeaves to NurturingLeaves, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 381 (1985).
45.
ARLIE HOCHSCHILD & ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND
THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 3 (1989).
46.

SUZANNE M. BIANCHI ET AL., CHANGING RHYTHMS OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 177
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Unlike women in the other industrialized states, however, most
American women lack support for maternity leave and childcare. 47 The
Family and Medical Leave Act assures certain employees maternity leave,
without pay, for up to twelve weeks.48 Every other industrialized state
assures women paid maternity leave, often for extended periods of time.49
This is linked to generous family leave policies, which allow parents to care
for babies and young children at the state's expense. 50
Although such programs are usually gender-neutral, women are much
more likely to take advantage of them than men. 5 1 This results in weaker
labor force attachments, in general, for women in Europe compared with
women in the United States. As Julie Suk notes, this is problematic for
American feminists, who have long argued in favor of such generous family
leave. 52 To the extent that such policies exacerbate the sexual division of
labor, Suk suggests, they are at best a mixed blessing. Rather, the absence of
such policies contributes to the shrinking wage gap between American
women and men. 53
Over time, however, American women earn far less than men.
According to the Institute for Women's Policy Research,
taking into account women's lower work hours and their years
with zero earnings due to family care ... women workers in their
prime earning years earned 62% less than men, or only $0.38 for
(2006); see also Melissa A. Milkie et al., The Time Squeeze: ParentalStatuses andFeelings About
Time With Children,66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 739 (2004).
47.
California and New Jersey are the only two states with public paid leave family insurance
programs. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAILING ITS FAMILIES: LACK OF PAID LEAVE AND WORKFAMILY SUPPORTS IN THE US 22-23 (2011), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/us02l 1webwcover.pdf (noting that California, New Jersey, New York, Rhode
Island, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico additionally provide Temporary Disability Insurance (TDI) for
"disabilities" caused by pregnancy-related complications, childbirth, and recovery from childbirth).
See Paid Family Care Leave Act, CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3301(a) (1) (West 2011) ("Family
temporary disability insurance shall provide up to six weeks of wage replacement benefits to
workers who take time off work to care for a seriously ill child, spouse, parent, domestic partner, or
to bond with a minor child within one year of the birth or placement of the child in connection with
foster care or adoption."); Temporary Disability Benefits Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-39.3 (West
2011), available at http://lwd.dol.state.nj.us/labor/forms_pdfs/tdi/Law.pdf (entitling an employee to
six weeks of paid leave to care for a newborn child).
48.

Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).

49.
World's Women, supra note 31, at 213-17. The United Kingdom, for example, covers
90% of wages for 52 weeks. Id. at 217. Sweden covers 480 days at 80% of wages. Id at 216.
50.

Id.

51.

Miranda, supra note 26, at 4.

52.

Suk, supra note 4, at 4.

53.

CATALYST, WOMEN'S EARNINGS AND INCOME 3 (2011) (reporting based on median

income for full-time, year round workers). In 2009, women earned 77% as much as men. Women's
earnings increased 44% from 1970 to 2007, compared with 6% growth for men. Id. at 4.
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every dollar men earned. During that 15-year period, the average
woman earned only $273,592 (in 1999 dollars) while the average
man earned $722,693 (in 1999 dollars).54
Thus, although the lack of paid maternity and family leave corresponds to
greater parity regarding wages for American women and men in some age
groups, this apparent parity vanishes over time. This correlates directly with
women's assumption of family responsibilities: "[d]uring [a] 15-year period,
the more likely women are to be married and have children under 18, the
more likely it is that they will be low earners and have fewer hours in the
labor market."5 5 When American women have children-and most
American women do 5 6-their average earnings plummet.57
2. Healthcare
Unlike women in the other industrialized states, moreover, many
American women do not have health insurance.58 According to the census,
the rate of women under 65 without health insurance rose to 19.7 percent in
2010, or 19 million women, the highest rate in more than a decade. 5 9 This
leaves American women especially vulnerable to reproductive health
problems. Even women with employer-based health insurance are often left
exposed. 60 As Sylvia Law points out, "[m]ore U.S. women confront
unintended pregnancy than women in nearly every other developed country.
One reason is that most employment-based health insurance programs in the
United States exclude payment for contraceptives from otherwise
comprehensive coverage for prescription drugs and medical services." 6 1 Nor
54.

Id. at 5.

55.
Id. ("The opposite is true for men: Men who are married and have dependent children are
more likely to have higher earnings and work longer hours.").
56.
See JANE LAWLER DYE, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN: JUNE
2008, at 3 tbl.1 (Nov. 2008), http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p20-563.pdf (showing that
54.3% of women between the ages of 15 and 44 had raised at least one child during or before 2008);
see generally DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE

MEANING OF LIBERTY 10 (1997) (noting that, "[b]eing a mother is considered a woman's major
social role. Society defines all women as mothers or potential mothers").
57. See CATALYST, supra note 53. See also Joan Williams, Want Gender Equality? Die
Childless at Thirty, WOMEN'S L. REP. 3 (2006) (keynote address).
58.

INST. MED. NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., INSURING AMERICA'S HEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND

RECOMMENDATIONS (2004), available at www.iom.edu/-/media/Files/Report%20Files/2004/
Insuring-Americas-Health-Principles-and-Recomendations/uninsured6EnglishFINAL.pdf
59.

NWLC, supranote 34.

60. Id. The percentage of women with employer-sponsored health insurance declined to
60.6% in 2010, a decrease of over 0.6 million women from the prior year.
61.

Sylvia Law, Sex Discrimination and Insurancefor Contraception, WASH. L. REv. 363
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can women depend on Medicaid or the states to pay for abortion. The
Supreme Court upheld the refusal to pay for poor women's abortions in
Maher v. Roe 62 and Harrisv. McCrae.63

In March 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 64 requiring almost all Americans (ninety-four percent)
to obtain health insurance and providing subsidies enabling them to do so. 6 5
The price for Republican support, however, was the explicit exclusion of
coverage for abortion. 66 In addition, as noted above, the United States,
unlike other industrialized states, still does not recognize health care as a
human right. 67 The failure to explicitly acknowledge that it is in fact a
right,6 8 rather than a transitory policy preference, leaves the right to health
vulnerable to the attacks and erosion already underway. 69
(1998). According to a recent study by the Independent Institute of Medicine, commissioned by the
Obama administration, as recently as 2008, roughly half of all pregnancies in the United States were
unplanned; 42% of these unintended pregnancies ended in abortion. Excerptsfrom a Health Report,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2012, at A3.
62.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 465-68 (1977) (holding that neither the state nor the federal
government must pay for a poor woman's abortion, even if childbirth is covered).
63.
Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (holding that "[t]he financial constraints that
restrict an indigent woman's ability to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of
choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her
indigency"). But see Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE
L.J. 1281, 1320 (1991):
Only women can be disadvantaged, for a reason specific to sex, through statemandated restrictions on abortion. The denial of funding for Medicaid abortions
obviously violates this right. The Medicaid issue connects the maternity historically
forced on African American women integral to their exploitation under slavery with
the motherhood effectively forced on poor women, many of whom are Black, by
deprivation of government funding for abortions. For those who have not noticed, the
abortion right has already been lost: this was when.
64.
JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL & ECON. STUDIES, PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT OF 2010: ADVANCING HEALTH EQUITY FOR RACIALLY AND ETHNICALLY DIVERSE

POPULATIONS I (Dennis P. Andrulis et al. eds., 2010), available at http://www.jointcenter.org/
research/patient-protection-and-affordable-care-act-of-2010-advancing-health-equity-for-raciallyand.
65.
How The Health Care Law Benefits You, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/facts/bystate/Making-a-Difference-National.html (last updated Dec.
31, 2013).
66.
Stupak Amendment to H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2010) Rev. 108 (barring abortion
coverage in "public option" portion of plan as well as barring inclusion of such coverage from any
plan purchased by anyone receiving federal subsidy).
67.

Human Right to Health, NAT'L ECON. & Soc. RIGHTS INITIATIVE, http://www.nesri.org/

programs/health (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
68.
See Law & Versteeg, supra note 5; Health Care is a Human Right, AMNESTY INT'L USA,
http://www.amnestyusa.org/our-work/issues/poverty-and-human-rights/health-care-in-theus?id= 1021216 (last visited Feb. 13, 2014).
69.

See Dorothy Samuels, Where Abortion Rights are Disappearing,N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25,
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1II. THE CONSTITUTION
Civil and political rights are enshrined in our Constitution. The Bill of
Rights was drafted to protect the rights of male citizens to participate in civic
and political life. They are worth most to those women who seek "formal"
equality-who demand the same rights as men. When women seek freedom
of speech, for example, they can rely on well-developed first amendment
jurisprudence. 70
When women demand reproductive rights or seek support for
reproductive work, in contrast, they are on their own. These rights, and this
work, focus on women's experiences of conception, pregnancy, childbirth,
and child-rearing. They are rarely encountered in traditional rights
discourse.7 1 The Supreme Court, however, has held in a long line of cases
that "our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family
relationships, child rearing, and education." 72 The parameters of that
constitutional protection are discussed in the next section.
A. Reproductive Rights
The plaintiff in Griswold v. Connecticut73 challenged a Connecticut
statute criminalizing the provision of contraceptives and medical advice
regarding their use. Citing earlier cases in which the Court had held that
parents had a constitutionally-protected interest in deciding how their
children were to be educated, the Court situated the right to privacy in the
penumbra of the Ninth Amendment. But Griswold only protected married
couples. 74 As Justice Douglas explained,

2011, at SR14 (noting "newly intensified drive by anti-abortion forces"). See also JOINT CTR. FOR
POLITICAL & ECON. STUDIES, supra note 64; see infra Part tI.B.
70.
See, e.g., Mary Becker, Patriarchyand Inequality: Toward a Substantive Feminism, 1999
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 21, 24-25 (suggesting that, if women simply seek 'a bigger piece of the pie' . . .
the women who succeed will be those who are male-centered and male-identified"). See also
Franklin, supra note 2, at 141 (noting that in the 1980s feminists criticized Ginsburg's early work
with male plaintiffs as "status-quo-affirming").
71.
As Brenda Cossman argues, "citizenship has always been sexed." Brenda Cossman,
Sexual Citizens: Freedom, Vibrators, and Belonging, in GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF
WOMEN'S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 289 (Linda C. McClain & Joanna L. Grossman eds., 2009)
(hereinafter GENDER EQUALITY); Men, too, have reproductive rights and these, too, may be denied.
See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1972) (holding unmarried father had custodial rights
to his children after their mother died). The ways in which the denial-and the assurance-of men's
reproductive rights reproduce gender are beyond the scope of this Article.
72.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).

73.

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

74.

Id. at 485.
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Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of
marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?
The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the
marriage relationship.
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rightsolder than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.
As a practical matter, the availability of birth control pills gave married
women unprecedented control over their own fertility, but the husband was
still the decision maker in the traditional couple. 76 Reproductive rights were
not extended to individuals, including unmarried women, until Eisenstadtv.
Baird in 1972, in which the court struck a Massachusetts law allowing
doctors and pharmacists to provide contraceptives only to married persons. 77
Scholars have criticized the privacy rationale for reproductive rights
since its first articulation. Feminists have noted the downsides of "privacy"
for women. 79 First, as Linda McClain observes: "privacy connotes female
seclusion and subordination, leading to women's underparticipation in
society and vulnerability to violence in the home." 8 0 Domestic violence is a
well-known risk for women seeking abortions. As Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor noted in striking Pennsylvania's spousal notification law in
Casey:

75.

Id. at 485-86.

76.

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442 ("By marriage, the husband and wife are

one person in law; that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing,
protection, and cover, she performs everything . . . .") (footnote omitted). See also NORMA BASCH,
IN THE EYES OF THE LAW 19-20 (1982) (noting that, "[tihe wife's inferior status [in the common
law] had a religious and metaphysical foundation in Western culture"); LERNER, supra note 10.
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). As Janet Dolgin notes, by applying the notion of
77.
individual autonomy to the family, the Eisenstadt court ignored the historic understanding of
"family". Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and Beyond, 82
GEO. L.J. 1519, 1545-46 (2004). For an insightful exploration, see Elizabeth M. Schneider, The
Dialectic of Rights and Politics:Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589,
634-42 (1986) (explaining how the struggle for reproductive rights shaped, and was shaped by, the
women's movement).
As Justice Stewart observed, dissenting in Griswold, "[The Connecticut statute] is an
78.
uncommonly silly law." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
see also John Hart Ely, Foreword: On DiscoveringFundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REV. 5 (1979)
(arguing that privacy lacks a coherent conceptual basis).
79.

See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE

AND LAW 93-102 (1987) (arguing that the public/private distinction has been detrimental to
women).
80.

Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of Privacy, 40

WM. & MARY L. REV. 759, 762 (1999).
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[T]here are millions of women in this country who are the victims
of regular physical and psychological abuse at the hands of their
husbands. Should these women become pregnant, they may have
very good reasons for not wishing to inform their husbands of their
decision to obtain an abortion. Many may have justifiable fears of
physical abuse .. . Many may fear devastating forms of
psychological abuse . 81
Second, "privacy" is negative-it requires the state to refrain from
interfering in our lives rather than imposing any affirmative duty to make
them better. As Frances Olsen and others point out, grounding reproductive
rights in privacy, accordingly, undercuts claims for public funding.82 Until
the passage of the Affordable Care Act, requiring health insurance to include
contraception,83 the United States generally failed to recognize affirmative
reproductive rights. 84 This meant that American women, enjoyed only the
reproductive rights they can afford.8 5
United States proponents of reproductive rights have long argued that
these rights should be grounded in "equality." 8 6 As Neil Siegel and Reva
Siegel recently discovered, Justice Ginsburg relied on equality while
representing a pregnant service woman in 1972.87 As Anita Allen explains,
the equality argument includes two propositions. First, "prohibiting abortion
is a form of primafacie or de jure sex discrimination .. . [second] it results
from constitutionally unacceptable stereotypes ....88

81.

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893 (1992).

82.

Frances Olsen, UnravelingCompromise, 103 HARv. L. REv. 105, 134 (1990).

83.
Health Res. & Serv. Admin. (HRSA), Women's Preventive Services Guidelines, U.S.
DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/ [hereinafter HRSA] (last
visited Apr. 2, 2014) (providing an exception for religious employers).
84.

See supra Part II.C.2.

85. See, e.g., Stupak Amendment to H.R. 3962, supra note 66 (describing effects of Stupak
amendment).
86.
CHAMALLAS, supra note 19, at 304; Anita L. Allen, The ProposedEqual Protection Fix
for Abortion Law: Reflections on Citizenship, Gender, and the Constitution, 18 HARv. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 419 (1995) [hereinafter Allen, Reflections].
87.
Siegel & Siegel, supra note 2, at 773. Katharine Bartlett, then a law student, made a
similar argument. Bartlett, supra note 18. See also Barbara A. Brown et al., The Equal Rights
Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 893-94 (1971);
Law & Versteeg, supra note 5, at 779 (noting that the failure of the Constitution to assure women's
rights is one of the features that makes it a global outlier).
88. Allen, Reflections, supra note 86, at 437 (emphasis added). As Ginsburg noted, "[tlhus,
legal challenges to undue restrictions on abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some
generalized notion of privacy; rather, they center on a woman's autonomy to determine her life's
course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature." Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 172 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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But, there are problems with equality under constitutional doctrine. As
Law notes: "[T]he development of modem constitutional sex equality
doctrine has suffered from a lack of focus on biological reproductive
differences between men and women."89 In addition, the Supreme Court
only views sex-based classifications as "quasi-suspect." 90 Unlike race, they
do not trigger strict scrutiny. As Suzanne Goldberg has shown, this produced
a hopelessly convoluted jurisprudence.91 Like privacy doctrine, moreover,
equal protection imposes no affirmative obligations on the state.
Third, as Martha Fineman, Robin West, and Ruth Colker have argued,
"equality" doesn't go far enough. As Fineman explains, "an impoverished
sense of equality is embedded in our current legal doctrine. We understand
equality in terms that are formal, focused on discrimination, and inattentive
to underlying societal inequities." 92 West, similarly, faults the legalistic
safeguards of Roe and Casey for neglecting the social and economic
circumstances in which reproductive choices are made. 93 Colker is the most
concrete: "[a] woman, in my view, has the right to seek an abortion to
protect the value of her life in a society that disproportionately imposes the
burdens of pregnancy and child care on women and does not sufficiently

Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984); see also
89.
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Synergy of Equality and Privacy in Women's Rights, 2002 U. CHI.
LEGAL. F. 137, 147-50 (discussing intersection between privacy and equality in the context of
reproductive rights).
90.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 220 (1976) (striking Oklahoma law setting a higher age
limit for males than for females to purchase 3.2% beer because the sex-based classification was not
"substantially related" to "important governmental objectives").
91.
Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 481-85 (2004).
Goldberg argues for a single standard for equal protection analysis. See generally Symposium, Two
Decades of Intermediate Scrutiny: Evaluating Equal Protectionfor Women, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER
Soc. POL'Y & L. 1 (1997). Law argues that the burden should be on the state in cases of sex
discrimination: "[g]iven how central state regulation of biology has been to the subjugation of
women, the normal presumption of constitutionality is inappropriate and the state should bear the
burden of justifying its rule . . . ." Law, supra note 89, at 1009.
Ratification of CEDAW would not necessarily subject gender-based regulations to the
same standard as race-based regulations, however. As Charlesworth and Chinkinh pointed out, the
obligations imposed on states parties under the Women's Convention require them to take "all
appropriate measures without delay" in contrast to the "immediately binding" obligations imposed
under the Race Convention. CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 23, at 45.
Martha Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition,
92.
20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 2 (2008).
93.
Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: De-ConstitutionalizingAbortion
Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394 (2009). West argues elsewhere that, "'[m]othering children, as we
presently socially construct that work . . . is incompatible with the basic rights and responsibilities of
citizenship . . . .'" Balkin, supra note 15, at 20. Assuring reproductive rights, for West, is
"pathetically inadequate." Id. at 21. But see Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: The Constitutional Law
and Politics of Reproductive Rights, 118 YALE LJ. 1312, 1314-15 (criticizing West's Yale
symposium article for slighting the accomplishments of reproductive rights advocates).
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sponsor the development and use of safe, effective contraceptives." 94
In addition, Ninth Amendment privacy analysis in the abortion cases
also recognizes the State's interest in "potential life." 9 5 The woman's right
of privacy does not outweigh this interest as long as the state statute or
regulation does not lace "a substantial obstacle" in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion. This odd formulation begs the question at the core of
the privacy analysis, i.e., whether a fetus is considered a "person." As
Balkin and others have pointed out, if a fetus is a person from the moment of
conception, allowing abortion in the case of incest or rape makes no more
sense than excusing murder because the victim was produced from a coerced
or incestuous union. 98 Siegel suggests that statutes permitting abortion in
cases of rape or incest implicitly concede the point. 99
B. Reproductive Work

The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that reproductive workbearing, caring for, raising and educating children-is protected from state
interference under the Constitution. States cannot require parents to send
their children to public school. 100 Nor can they prevent parents from having

94.

Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology andAbortion: TowardLove, Compassion,and Wisdom,

77 CAL. L. REv. 1011, 1050 (1989); see also RUTH COLKER, ABORTION AND DIALOGUE: PRO-

CHOICE AND AMERICAN LAW (1992).
95.

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150 (1973).

96. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992). As Johnsen notes, "Casey
allowed the government substantially greater authority to interfere with women's reproductive
choices. The Court overruled protective rulings from the 1980s and upheld the very types of
restrictions it previously had held to be unconstitutional." Dawn E. Johnsen, A Progressive
Reproductive Rights Agenda for 2020, in THE CONSTITUTION IN2020, at 255, 257 (Jack M. Balkin &
Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009). But see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst ConstitutionalDecision of
All Time, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995, 996 (2003) (arguing that Casey "implicates the human
existence of millions of lives a year" referring to "human unborn child[ren]").
97.
Philip Alston, The Unborn Child and Abortion Under the Draft Convention on the Rights
of the Child, 12 HUM. RTS. Q. 156, 173 (1990).
98.

Balkin, supra note 15, at 46-47. Mark Tushnet, Revised Opinions in Roe v. Wade and

Doe v. Bolton: TUSHNET, J., concurring,in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 89 (Jack M.

Balkin ed., 2005) (noting that, "[n]o prosecutor has ever returned a murder indictment charging the
taking of the life of a fetus. This would not be the case if the fetus constituted human life") (quoting
Tom C. Clark, Religion, Morality, and Abortion: A ConstitutionalAppraisal,2 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1,
9-10 (1969)).
"The statutory exception allowing women to have abortions if they conceive by rape
99.
indicates that the state's decision to prohibit abortion rests on unarticulated assumptions about how
women are to comport themselves sexually-a code the state enforces by selectively allowing
women access to abortion." Reva B. Siegel, Revised Opinions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton:
SIEGEL, J, concurring,in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 77 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).

100.

See generally Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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their children taught a foreign language in school.' 0 1 While the precise scope
of this protection is contested, especially with respect to abortion, 10 2 the
basic right is well-established.
What is not contested- what is rarely even discussed- is that almost
none of this protection receives state support. With the exception of public
education, a few struggling federal programs,1 03 and the recent ACA
initiative, 104 reproductive work receives no support in the United States.
While the "decision" whether to bear a child is protected as a fundamental
liberty interest, paid leave to care for the newborn is not assured. 10 5 Parental
choices regarding education are given considerable deference,10 but if a

101.

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).

102.
Sixty-one state laws restricting access to abortion, including mandatory waiting periods
and "demeaning 'counseling' sessions lacking a real medical justification," were enacted during the
first eight months of 2011. See Samuels, supra note 69, at SR14. Only twelve states have no such
onerous restrictions. Id.
The scope of protection for pregnant workers, similarly is disputed. See, e.g., Joanna L.
Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567 (2010);
Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the Pregnancy
DiscriminationAct's Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15 (2009); Dina Bakst,
Pregnant, and Pushed Out of a Job, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/
01/31/opinion/pregnant-and-pushed-out-of-a-job.html (noting that, while "three-quarters of women
now entering the work force will become pregnant on the job," because of a gap between
discrimination and disability laws, employers are not required to "accommodate most pregnant
workers in any way").
103.
See Binyamin Appelbaum & Robert Gebeloff, Even Critics of Safety Net Increasingly
Depend on It, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/us/even-critics-ofsafety-net-increasingly-depend-on-it.html?pagewanted=all (noting that the share of federal benefits
to the poorest 20% has declined from 54% in 1979 to 36% in 2007). These programs include: The
Children's Health Insurance Program ("CHIP"), Head Start, Special Supplemental and Nutrition
Program for Women, Infants and Children ("WIC"), and Vaccines for Children Program ("VFC").
What is CHIP?,INSUREIKIDSNOW.GOv, http://www.insurekid snow.gov/chip/index.html (last visited
Feb. 14, 2014) (explaining the program that provides free or low-cost health insurance for eligible
children up to age nineteen); About Head Start, HEAD START, http://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.
gov/hslc/hs/about (last visited Mar. 27, 2014) (promoting "the school readiness of children ages birth
to five from low-income families by enhancing their cognitive, social, and emotional development");
Special Supplemental Nutrition Programfor Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), NUTRITION.GOV,
http://www.nutrition.gov/food-assistance-programs/wic-women-infants-and-children
(last visited
Feb. 14, 2014) (safeguarding the nutritional health of low-income women and children age five and
below); Vaccines for Children Program, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/vfc/index.html (Feb. 14, 2014) (offering free vaccinations
for children who otherwise would not receive them because they cannot afford them).
104.

See HRSA, supra note 83.

105.
See Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006). Even the two states that do
provide paid leave do not ground the leave in their constitutions. Id.
106.
See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (striking state statute
requiring children to attend public school noting that "[tihe child is not the mere creature of the state;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding that
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state chooses to reduce funding in a non-discriminatory manner, the
Constitution poses no obstacle. In fact, it is well settled that economic rights
in general are not protected under the United States Constitution,10 7
although several eminent scholars have argued that they should be.108 The
United States provides virtually no material support for reproductive work.
What it does provide takes the form of policy preferences, which can be
revoked.109
The Constitution is silent about the social importance of reproduction,
that is, its importance to the larger community. As Sylvia Law pointed out
twenty-five years ago, "Silence, absolute and deafening, is the central theme
of the original founders' discussions of women and families." 1 10 The
Constitution does not contemplate pregnant or nursing workers, and their
children. Rather, it allows ongoing and widespread discrimination against
them.111 It ignores what Joan Williams calls "[o]ur [f]amily-[h]ostile
[p]ublic [p]olicy,"l i.e., the dearth of support, from the lack of affordable,
quality daycare to the inflexibility which distinguishes American workplaces
state cannot prevent parents from having their children learn a foreign language); see generally
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child? ": Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property,
33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995 (1992) (criticizing cases for neglecting children's perspectives).
107.
See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (no right to
sleep in public places); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (holding no right to Medicaid funding
for abortion); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972) (holding no right to housing). See also
Law & Versteeg, supra note 5 (noting that the failure of the Constitution to assure economic rights is
one of the major features making it a global outlier).
108.
See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Further Reflections on the Constitutional Justice of
Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (1986) (discussing the derivation of a "constitutional
right to a decent material basis for life"); Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival:
Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1623, 1628 (1988) ("'[M]inimum protections' for the
necessities of life . . . are preconditions for civic republican citizenship."); Frank 1. Michelman, The
Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Foreward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). See also Goodwin Lui, Rethinking Constitutional Welfare
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203 (2008). Some economic rights are assured under state constitutions.
See Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the United States and International Human Rights Law:
Towardan "EntirelyNew Strategy," 44 HASTINGS L.J. 79 (1992).
109.

See Samuels, supranote 69, at SRI 4.

110.
Sylvia Law, The Founders on Families, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 583, 586 (1987). For a rich
and evocative depiction of the tensions between the needs of the family and the demands of the state
in the American colonies, see MARY BETH NORTON, FOUNDING MOTHERS & FATHERS: GENDERED
POWER AND THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY (1996).

111.

See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 102, at 575-78; Grossman & Thomas, supra note 102, at

23.
112.

JOAN C. WILLIAMS, RESHAPING THE WORK-FAMILY DEBATE: WHY MEN AND CLASS

MATTER 33 (2010). See also David Leonhardt, A Market Punishingto Mothers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/business/economy/04leonhardt.html (noting that "[t]he
main barrier [to gender equality] is the harsh price most workers pay for pursuing anything other
than the old-fashioned career path. 'Women do almost as well as men today,' Ms. Waldfogel said,
'as long as they don't have children'").
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from their European counterparts. 113
IV. CEDAW
Cary Franklin provides a rich account of the development of gender
equality in Sweden and its impact on Ginsburg. 114 Long after Ginsburg
came home however, women in Europe, and indeed women throughout the
world continued to work toward gender equality. Their efforts produced
CEDAW, as well as a series of global conferences, and UN initiatives for
women. 115
CEDAW addresses the major American complaints regarding the
support for reproductive work. Equality under CEDAW is more muscular
than equality under American equal protection doctrine. First, CEDAW bars
all forms of legal discrimination against women, public as well as private,
intentional or inadvertent. 116 Second, it requires states to focus on the
"underlying societal inequities" that concern Finemanl 17 and, as West urges,
to proactively address the social and economic circumstances in which
reproductive choices are made. 118 Third, CEDAW imposes affirmative
obligations on the state to support women's rights, including but not limited
to their reproductive rights. Finally, CEDAW explicitly focuses on
reproductive work and the responsibilities of individual men, as well as the
state, to support it.
A. Women's Human Rights
CEDAW requires states to assure women's human rights, including
their rights to participate in social, economic, cultural, and political life on
equal terms with men. These rights include the civil and political rights
familiar to Americans from our own Constitution, such as the right to
vote 11 9 and freedom of movement. 120 These rights also include less familiar

113.

WILLIAMS,

supra note 112, at 34-35.

114.

Franklin, supra note 2, at 97-105.

115.
For a general introduction, see Barbara Stark, Women's Rights, in 5
HUMAN RIGHTS 341 (David P. Forsythe ed., 2009).

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

116.
See infra Part IV.A; Judith Resnik, What's Federalism For?, in THE CONSTITUTION IN
2020, at 269, 275 (Jack M. Belkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
117.

See supra text accompanying note 92.

118.

See supra text accompanying note 93.

119.

CEDAW, supra note 6, at 194-95.

120.

Id. at 196.
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economic and social rights, such as the right to work 2 1 and the right to
health. 122
Thus, CEDAW assures positive as well as negative rights, imposing
affirmative obligations on the state. Under CEDAW, moreover, rights are to
be assured in actual, daily life. That is, CEDAW not only requires formal
equality (equality of opportunity); it requires result equality.123
CEDAW's bar against "discrimination" is more robust than that set out
in the 14 th Amendment:
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term
"discrimination against women" shall mean any distinction,
exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the
effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital
status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural, civil or any other field.124
Under Article 2, furthermore, "States Parties condemn discrimination
against women in all its forms [and] agree to pursue by all appropriate
means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against
women. . . ."125 Article 4 specifically provides for affirmative action "aimed
at accelerating de facto equality.... 126 CEDAW, in short, requires the
state to assure actual equality between women and men, sooner rather than
later.

121.

Id. at 195 -96.

122.

Id. at 196.

123.
CHARLESWORTH & CHINKIN, supra note 23, at 217; see generally MARTHA FINEMAN,
THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY (1990) (exploring the effect of family law, both instrumental and

symbolic, on gender equality).
124.

CEDAW, supra note 6, at 194.

125.

Id. at 194-95.

126.

Id. at 195. There is an enormous amount of literature on CEDAW. Some sources

especially pertinent here include: Andrew Byrnes, Human Rights Instruments Relating Specifically
to Women with Particular Emphasis on Convention to Eliminate All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, in ADVANCING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: USING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS STANDARDS IN DOMESTIC LITIGATION 39 (Andrew Bymes et al. eds., 1997); Rebecca J.

Cook, State Accountabilityfor Violations of Women's Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN
228 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994); LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST WOMEN (1993); Alda Facio & Martha 1. Morgan, Equity or Equality for Women?

UnderstandingCEDA W's Equality Principles,60 ALA. L. REV. 1133 (2009).
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B. Reproduction and the Reproduction of Gender

CEDAW crucially, explicitly addresses reproduction and reproductive
work. 127 Under Article 5, reproduction is both supported by the state and
disaggregated from women's traditional roles. First, Article 5(a) requires
states to "take all appropriate measures:"
To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of
the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women[.]1 28
CEDAW recognizes that the reproduction of gender is socially constructed,
that it is neither immutable nor "natural," and that it violates women's rights.
The "stereotyped roles" that Article 5 bars include that particular culture's
"division of tasks by sex." 1 29 This is more ambitious than the bar on
stereotyping envisioned in Ginsburg's early work, reflecting almost four
decades of work by the international women's movement that first inspired
her. 130
In its responses to the reports filed by states parties, the Committee has
clarified the scope of this provision, drawing on concrete examples from the
Reports themselves. In Slovakia, for example, the Committee has noted "the
persistence of traditional stereotypes regarding the roles and tasks of women
and men in the family and in society at large."'31 Nigeria, similarly, reported
on six programs undertaken to eliminate stereotypes pursuant to Article 5,
127.
Article 10 of the Economic Covenant requires states to afford some protections to
mothers, but CEDAW is the first human rights instrument to comprehensively address reproduction.
See, e.g., CEDAW, supra note 6, Arts. 5, I1, 12, 14, and 16.
128.
CEDAW, supra note 6, Art. 5. The effects, if any, of this prohibition on beauty pageants,
drag queens, and what Robin West has called "women's hedonic lives" or pornography is beyond
the scope of this Article. Robin West, The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A
Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 15 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 149 (2000); see
generally Franklin, supra note 2, at 163-72 (describing implications of a bar on sex-role
stereotyping on LGBT rights); Barbara Stark, The Women's Convention, Reproductive Rights, and
the Reproduction of Gender, 18 DUKE J. GENDER & L. 223, 274-78 (2011) [hereinafter Stark,
Reproductive Rights] (explaining why CEDAW requires the recognition of same-sex relationships).
129.
See supra text accompanying note 14. The U.S. delegate repeatedly stressed that the
father's responsibility for childcare be explicit in Article 5. REHOF, supranote 126, at 86-87.
130.

See Franklin, supra note 2.

131.
U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Slovakia, 41' Sess., June 30-July 2008, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SVK/CO/4, at 4, available
at
http://www.iwraw-ap.org/committee/pdf/41_concludingobservations/slovakia.pdf
(recommending "that policies be developed and programmes implemented to ensure the eradication
of traditional sex role stereotypes in the family, labor market, the health sector, academia, politics
and society at large").
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including a new "National Policy on Education ... aimed at encouraging
increased participation of the girl child in science and technology" and data
indicating that women are "beginning to undertake those vocations which
were previously considered masculine such as motor mechanic, welding,
commercial drivers and motor-cyclists." 132 In its Concluding Observations,
the Committee: "welcome[ed] the adoption by 18 states of the Child Rights
Act, which sets the minimum age of marriage at 18 years" but noted with
concern section 29 of the Constitution, which states that "a woman is
deemed to be of full age upon marriage" and urged the repeal of the
offending section without delay. 133
The division of labor by sex may seem universal, such as the ubiquity
of female nurses, 134 or it may not, such as the cultural ban in Saudi Arabia
against female cashiers in supermarkets.1 35 Article 5 bars all of these
stereotypes, even as it recognizes men's responsibility for reproductive
work. Women, like men, have rights under CEDAW; and men, like women,
are expected to take care of their children. 136
As noted above, because reproductive rights focus on experiencesconception, pregnancy, childbirth-that affect women more directly than
they affect men, these experiences are not reflected in traditional rights

132.
U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of CEDAW:
Sixth Periodic Report of States Parties: Nigeria, U.N. Doe. CEDAW/C/NGA/6, at 53 (Oct. 5, 2006),
available at http://www.iwraw-ap.org/resources/pdf/41_official-documents/nigeriaNGA6.pdf.
133.
U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), Concluding Observations of the Comm. On the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women: Nigeria, 41" Sess., June 30-July 2008, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/NGA/CO/6, at 5, available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/co/CEDAW-C-NGA-CO-6.pdf
In
addition,
"[t]he Committee noted[d] the continued high incidence of female genital mutilation in some areas
of the country . . . . [and] the absence of national legislation prohibiting this harmful traditional
practice[,]" and also went beyond the subjects addressed by Nigeria to focus on "the persistence of
patriarchal attitudes and deep-rooted stereotypes concerning women's roles and responsibilities that
discriminate against women and perpetuate their subordination within the family and society ....
[and] the persistence of entrenched harmful traditional and cultural norms and practices, including
widowhood rites and practices." Id. at 4-5.
134.

See, e.g., WORLD BANK, GENDER ISSUES IN AGRICULTURAL LABOR (2007); Some

Occupations Becoming More Gender-Neutral, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK Q. 48 (Winter 2004-05),
availableat http://www.bls.gov/opub/ooq/2004/winter/oochart.pdf (noting that men in United States
increased their share of employment in nursing between 1983 and 2002, although the field remains
dominated by women).
135.
See, e.g., Fatima Sidiya, Debate Rages Over Saudi Women Working as Cashiers,ARAB
NEWS (Aug. 18, 2010), http://arabnews.com/saudiarabia/articlel06238.ece?. See generally Margarita
Estevez-Abe, Gendering the Varieties of Capitalism:A Study of OccupationalSegregation by Sex in
Advanced IndustrialSocieties, 59 WORLD POL. 142, 143 (2006) (noting "genuine puzzles" in crossnational patterns).
136.
See NAGLE, supra note 15 (explaining "rightsholder" and "caregiver" stereotypes in
Aristotles's polis).
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discourse. 137 CEDAW recognizes this omission and requires states parties to
rectify it. Reproductive work must be recognized and respected by the state;
protected from infringement by non-state third parties, and affirmatively
supported. While CEDAW does not explicitly assure the right to abortion,
reflecting the lack of consensus among states, 138 CEDAW bars the denial of
women's reproductive rights. 139
Second, Article 5(b) requires the state to recognize maternity as a
"social function" and to educate men to share in reproductive work:
(b) To ensure that family education includes a proper
understanding of maternity as a social function and the recognition
of the common responsibility of men and women in the upbringing

137.

See supra Part ll.A.

138.
See, e.g., Law No. 239 of 24 Mar. 1970 on the Interruption of Pregnancy, amended by,
Law No. 564 of 19 July 1978 and Law No. 572 of 12 July 1985 (Finland), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/population/abortion/Finland.abo.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2014). See
generally David Bradley, Convergence in Family Law: Mirrors, Transplants and PoliticalEconomy,
6 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 127 (1999); Robert E. Jonas & John D. Gorby, West German
Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 J. MARSHALL J. PRAC. & PROC. 605 (1978);

Florian Miedel, Is West Germany's 1975 Abortion Decision a Solution to the American Abortion
Debate? A Critique of Mary Ann Glendon and Donald Kommers, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 471, 475 (1993-94).

The CEDAW Committee, moreover, has criticized states for prohibiting abortion. See,
e.g., LUISA BLANCHFIELD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN (CEDAW): ISSUES IN THE U.S. RATIFICATION

DEBATE 13 (2009), available at http://www.hrcnc.org/ Human RightsDocumentsfiles/
UNCEDAW issues.pdf (recommending that Mexico, "'review their legislation so that, where
necessary, women are granted access to rapid and easy abortion.' More recently, in 2007, the
Committee urged Poland 'to ensure that women seeking legal abortion have access to it, and that
their access is not limited by the use of the conscientious objection clause."') Id. (citations omitted).
The Committee has also pointed out that, "[i]t is discriminatory for a State party to refuse to provide
legally for the performance of certain reproductive health services for women." U.N. Comm. on the
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 20th Sess., Jan. 19-Feb. 5, 1999 & 21st
Sess., Jun. 7-25, 1999, U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev. 1; GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1999) at 1111.
But see id. at 13 (noting that CEDAW has been ratified without RUDs by several states limiting
abortion). "Currently, over 60% of the world's people live in countries where induced abortion is
permitted either for a wide range of reasons or without restriction as to reason. In contrast, about
26% of all people reside in countries where abortion is generally prohibited." CTR. FOR
REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, THE WORLD'S ABORTION LAWS MAP 2013 UPDATE (June 2013), available

at http://www.reproductiverights.org/ pdf/pubfac abortionlaws.pdf (listing countries).
139.

CEDAW, supra note 6, at art. 5. As Reva B. Siegel notes, this is crucial:
Perhaps the most prominent feature of the sexual equality approach to reproductive
rights is its attention to the social as well as physical aspects of reproductive relations.
A sex equality analysis is characteristically skeptical of the traditions, conventions, and
customs that shape the sex and family roles of men and women.

Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their CriticalBasis and Evolving
ConstitutionalExpression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815, 817 (2007); see, e.g., Berta E. Hernandez, To Bear or
Not to Bear: Reproductive Freedom as an InternationalHuman Right, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 309
(1991).
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and development of their children ... (emphasis added)140

As noted in a leading human rights text, "[t]he breadth and aspiration of
[Article 5] can be described only as striking."' 4 1 Article 5 is "striking" in at
least two ways. First, and crucially, like Ginsburg's early reliance on male
plaintiffs, it explicitly recognizes that gender stereotypes limit men as well
as women and that any meaningful notion of "equality" must address
both. 14 2 Second, as American critics of equal protection have long urged,
CEDAW recognizes and requires the state to support "maternity as a social
function."l143

Later articles explicitly protect women's reproductive rights and situate
reproduction in a social and cultural context. Article 11.2, for example, sets
out the measures to be taken by states to "prevent discrimination . . . on the
grounds of marriage or maternity and to ensure [women's] effective right to
work...."144

These measures include the prohibition of dismissal for

pregnancy or maternity leave, 14 5 maternity leave with pay or "comparable
social benefits," 1 46 and the "necessary supporting social services to enable
parents to combine family obligations with work responsibilities and
participation in public life, in particular through promoting the
establishment ... of child-care facilities."1 4 7 Article 12 requires the state to
"ensure access to healthcare services, including those related to family
planning" and, more specifically, to "ensure to women appropriate services
in connection with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period,
granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition during
pregnancy and lactation."1 4 8 Article 14 reiterates the right to family planning

140.

CEDAW, supranote 6, at art. 5.

141.

HENRY STEINER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 184 (2008).

142.
See Franklin, supranote 2, at 86-87 (noting that "when it became clear that the [Women's
Rights Project] was serious about establishing the right of men to be free from sex discrimination,
the laughter turned to confusion and disbelief, and, in some cases, to anger and disgust").
143.
See, e.g., Law, supra note 89; Fineman, supra note 92; West, supranote 93; Colker, supra
note 94.
144.

CEDAW, supranote 6. at Art. 11.2.

145.

Id. at Art. I1.2(b).

146.

Id.

147.

Id. at Art. 11.2(c).

148.
The Committee's General Recommendation No. 24 elaborates on Article 12.2, addressing
women's access to health care, including family planning services. For a more detailed formulation
of these rights, see the AFRICAN COMM'N ON HUMAN & PEOPLES' RIGHTS, PROTOCOL TO THE
AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN & PEOPLES' RIGHTS ON THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN AFRICA (Nov.

25, 2005), available at http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments/women-protocol/achpr

instr jroto

women eng.pdf. See generally CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS BRIEFING PAPER, THE PROTOCOL
ON THE RIGHT OF WOMEN IN AFRICA: AN INSTRUMENT FOR ADVANCING REPRODUCTIVE AND
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services for rural women in particular. Finally, Article 16 requires states to
"take all appropriate measure to eliminate discrimination against women in
all matters relating to marriage and family relations . . . ."149
It is undisputed that actual compliance with CEDAW varies
enormously. While reports from Sweden, for example, demonstrate ongoing
progress,150 other states persistently violate the treaty.151 Where those
seeking gender equality have access to the law, however, CEDAW has
become a mainstay of the legal culture. 152 As explained in the next section,
it could play a similar role in the United States.15 3

SEXUAL RIGHTS (Feb. 2006),
documents/pub bp africa.pdf.

available at

http://reproductiverights.org/sites/default/files/

149.
CEDAW, supra note 6, Art. 16. Article 16 has received an unprecedented number of
reservations. Rebecca Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of
Discrimination Against Women, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 643 (1990). Two States Parties to the
Convention-Malta and Monaco-"stated in their reservations to CEDAW that they do not interpret
Article 16(1) (e) as imposing or forcing the legalization of abortion in their respective countries."
BLANCHFIELD, supra note 138, at 14.
150.
U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of CEDAW: Combined Sixth
& Seventh Periodic Report of States Parties: Sweden, U.N. Doc CEDAW/C/SWE/7 (Sept. 14,
2006), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586bldc7b4043cl256a450044f331/
3697f8221Ob82fc3cl25729c0040c6b6/$FILE/NO655987.pdf.
151.
See Reporting Status by Country: Afghanistan: CEDA W, OFF. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUM.
RIGHTS, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/5038ebdcb712174dcl256a2a002796da/80256404004ff31
5cl25638c005c007e?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 19, 2014) (Afghanistan has ratified
CEDAW); see Reporting Status by Country: Yemen: CEDAW, OFF. HIGH COMM'R FOR HUM.
RIGHTS, http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/5038ebdcb712174dcl256a2a002796da/760dlbf29696bde
b8025674e003bf948?OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 19, 2014) (Yemen has ratified CEDAW and
has filed several Reports).
See Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2010, U.S. DEPT. STATE (Apr. 4, 2011),
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/ (noting that several LDCs, including "Afghanistan,
Bangladesh and Yemen, have persistent human rights problems including . .. violence and societal
discrimination against women").
152.
See, e.g., World's Women, supra note 31; Rachel A. Cichowski, Women's Rights, the
European Court, and SupranationalConstitutionalism,38 LAW. & Soc'Y REv. 489 (2004) (focusing
on the role of the European Court of Justice in the creation of women's rights); A, B & C v. Ireland,
[2010] Eur. Ct. H.R. 2032 (Dec. 16 2010) available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-102332 (holding that Ireland had failed to implement the constitutional right to a
legal abortion in violation of Article 8's guarantee of the right to respect for private and family life);
Carson Osberg, Inter-American Court Holds that Mexico Violated the Human Rights of Two Women
Raped by Mexican Military Personnel, HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF (Nov. 16, 2010)
http://hrbrief.org/2010/11 /inter-american-court-holds-that-mexico-violated-the-human-rights-of-twowomen-raped-by-mexican-military-personnel; But see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring
the Effects of Human Rights Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 171 (2003) (noting problems in
ascertaining causality).
153.
See Law & Versteeg, supra note 5, at 69 n.203 (describing a "substitution effect" in which
treaty rights substitute for constitutional rights). This is particularly useful where, like here, the
Constitution is rarely amended.
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C. In the UnitedStates

Despite our dismal record with respect to human rights treaties, Section
1 below assumes that the United States not only ratifies, but actually
complies with CEDAW. Section 2 explains how this would affect
reproductive rights and reproductive work in this country. Section 3
describes how this builds on broader changes in the labor force already
underway.
1. Assuming Good Faith
Ratification of CEDAW will transform the legal landscape in the
United States, for men as well as for women, if it is ratified in good faith.
This is a big "if." All of the major human rights treaties ratified by the
United States have been accompanied by a package of reservations,
understanding, and declarations ("RUDs") intended to limit their impact. 154
This both results from the United States' long and troubled history with
respect to international human rights and perpetuates that history. 15 5
The Obama administration has promised to do better. It has directed the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to move forward on CEDAW.1 5 6
Harold Koh, then Legal Advisor to the President, confirmed the President's
intent to ratify CEDAW as recently as October 2011, when he also
reaffirmed the Administration's commitment to human rights.1 57 Taking the
Administration at its word, the rest of this section assumes that the United
States ratifies CEDAW in good faith and analyses CEDAW's effects on
United States law.

154.
See, e.g., S. EXEC. DOc. No. 102-23, at 19 (1992) ("[T]he [Civil] Covenant will not create
a private cause of action in U.S. courts.").
155.
In 1953, Senator Bricker of Ohio proposed an amendment to the United States
Constitution which would require an act of Congress before any human rights treaty could become
law in the United States. The Eisenhower Administration was able to defeat the Bricker Amendment,
but only by promising not to ratify any human rights treaties. Louis B. SOHN & THOMAS
BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 964-65 (1973). See Louis Henkin,

U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L.
341, 349 (1995) (suggesting that, as a practical matter, Bricker has prevailed).
156.
Letter from Richard R. Verma, Assistant Sec'y of Legislative Affairs, to the Hon. John F.
Kerry, Chairman, Comm. on Foreign Relations. See Press Release, Nat'l. Org. for Women, CEDAW
Hearing Encouraging, U.S. Ratification Long Overdue (Nov. 19, 2010), availahle at
http://www.now.org/press/11-10/11-19.html?printable (applauding Senator Dick Durbin "for
chairing a first-ever Judiciary Committee hearing . .. on ratification of the [CEDAW]"). Ratification
of CEDAW has been on the agenda for a long time. See, e.g., MALVINA HALBERSTAM & ELIZABETH
DEFEIS, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE ERA? (1987).

157.
Harold Koh, Sterling Professor of Int'l Law, Yale Law, Address of Fordham Law School
International Law Weekend (Oct. 23, 2011); see also Harold Hongju Koh, America and the World,
2020, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 313 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
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2. Reproductive Rights and Reproductive Work
CEDAW would supersede, rather than overrule, the line of cases
beginning with Griswold,158 and including Eisenstadt,159 Roe v. Wade,160
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,I61 and
Gonzales v. Carhart.162 That is, reproductive rights, including the right to
contraception and abortion, would no longer be grounded exclusively in
Ninth Amendment privacy. Rather, these rights would also be assured by
CEDAW's affirmative guarantees and protected by its bar on the
reproduction of gender. 16 As discussed above,164 CEDAW recognizes the
obligation of the larger community to provide material support for
maternity-before, during, and after birth. As Law explains, this is crucial to
women's equality, which requires nothing less than the "transformation of
the family, child rearing arrangements, the economy, the wage labor market,
and human consciousness." 1 6 5
Under Article 12, all American women would have access to
contraception, which would probably limit the need for abortion.166 The
recent development of an after-sex pill that can prevent pregnancy if taken
within five days of intercourse
may further reduce the number of

158.

See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

159.

See generally Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).

160.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that under the Ninth Amendment, women
have a right to abortion subject to the state's interest in protecting the developing fetus).
161.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (affirming the "essential holding"
of Roe, while allowing the state to promote its "profound interest in potential life, throughout
pregnancy" so long as the measures adopted by the state do not constitute an "undue burden").
162.

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 127 (2007).

163.
For an in-depth analysis of abortion under CEDAW, see Stark, Reproductive Rights,
supra note 128, at 290-94.
164.

See supra Part IH.B.

165.
Law, supra note 89, at 956; see Leonhardt, supra note 112 (noting that, "[w]ith
Australia's recent passage of paid [parental] leave, the United States has become the only rich
country without such a policy").
166.
Some data indicate that the majority of American women who have had abortions said
that they were using contraceptives when they became pregnant. Balkin, supra note 15, at 5. But see
Gardiner Harris, Panel Recommends Approval of After-Sex Pill to Prevent Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES
(June 17, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/18/health/policy/18pill.html (noting that "more
than one million women who do not want to get pregnant are estimated to have unprotected sex
every night in the United States").
167.
Harris, supra note 166 (noting "dispute [as to] whether the [new] drug works by delaying
ovulation . . . or by preventing a fertilized egg from implanting itself in the uterus"); Nicholas D.
Kristof, Another Pill That Could Cause a Revolution (July 31, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/08/01/opinion/Olkristof.html (describing misoprostol, which is a single drug that may make
abortion safer and easier around the world); Emily Bazelon, The New Abortion Providers, N.Y.
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abortions sought.168 The use of teleconferencing to enable women in the first
nine weeks of pregnancy to obtain prescriptions for abortion pills,169
moreover, is likely to reduce the number of surgical, as opposed to medical
abortions.1 70 American abortion law, however, would also be affected.
CEDAW would establish a federal floor, situating abortion firmly in the
context of women's reproductive health. This has been obscured in this
country by the complicated politics of abortion. Ginsburg viewed Roe v.
Wade as a political mistake, for example, which "prolonged divisiveness and
deferred stable settlement of the issue."1 7 1 Justice William Brennan also
thought it would have been wiser to wait and see what the legislatures might
do, rather than set out Roe's trimester framework.172 More recently, Neal
Devins has argued that public opinion drives the law in this context, so
public opinion should be addressed before legal reform is attempted.173
Reva Siegel has carefully documented the ways in which "constitutional
culture channels social movement conflict"1 7 4 and how the right has tailored

TIMES, July 14, 2010, (Magazine), at 30, 44, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/18/
magazine/I 8abortion-t.html?pagewanted=all (noting that, "almost 90 percent of the abortions in the
U.S. are performed before 12 weeks; in addition, four years ago, the proportion of procedures
performed before 9 weeks reached 62 percent").
The morning-after pill, which is not a form of abortion, has been available for many years.
See, e.g., Editoral, Respect for Women in Uniform, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/15/opinion/15mon3.html (commending Pentagon's decision to
make moming-after emergency contraception available to women in the military, and criticizing
remaining rules making abortions available only in cases of rape, incest, or when women's lives are
endangered, and requiring women to pay for such abortions).
168.
Harris, supra note 166 (citing the Office of Population Research at Princeton University:
"more than one million women who do not want to get pregnant are estimated to have unprotected
sex every night in the United States, and more than 25,000 become pregnant every year after being
sexually assaulted. Half of all pregnancies in the United States are unintended. . . .").
169.
Monica Davey, Abortion Drugs Given in Iowa via Video Link, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/09/health/policy/09video.html?gwh=7DA4CI F87C61 AF041981 E
B938B695E69 (noting that 1,500 abortions have been performed in Iowa using teleconferencing
equipment at sixteen Iowa clinics since June 2008).
170.
Bazelon, supra note 167, at 46 (noting that, "[a]bortion remains the most common
surgical procedure for American women; one-third of them will have one by the age of 45. The
number performed annually in the U.S. has largely held steady: 1.3 million in 1977 and 1.2 million
three decades later").
171.

Balkin, supranote 15, at 11.

172.

Id. at 10.

173.
See generally Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much) Settled the
Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318 (2009).
174.
Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and Constitutional
Change: The Case of the defacto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (2006) (explaining how "equal
protection doctrine prohibiting sex discrimination was forged in the Equal Rights Amendment's
defeat").
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its arguments to reflect cultural change. 175 But as Jeffrey Toobin notes, the
efforts of pro-choice centrists to be respectful of their opponents comes at a
high cost to women's health. 176
The Roberts Court is apparently willing to leave reproductive rights to
the states. 177 As Dawn Johnsen notes, "[s]ince Casey, states have adopted
literally hundreds of abortion restrictions, reflecting an incremental,
multitiered strategy to create "abortion-free" states and to deter women from
having abortions, often through deception."1 78 These restrictions, even if
upheld under the Constitution, could certainly be challenged under
CEDAW's explicit protections. 179 As international law, moreover, under the
Supremacy Clause CEDAW would trump inconsistent state law regarding
reproductive rights.1 80
It would also trump inconsistent state law regarding reproductive work.
As noted earlier, the United States provides less support for reproductive
work than any other industrialized state. 18 1 This results in greater parity

175.
See generally Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the
Spreadof Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008) (explaining how the
right has tailored its arguments).
176.
Jeffrey Toobin, Not Covered, NEW YORKER (Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.newyorker.com/
talk/comment/2009/11/23/091123taco talk toobin.
177.
Charles M. Blow, Abortion's New Battle Lines, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/01/opinion/01blow.htmlgwh=1276FC18B804AED2B5ABl01F4
OEA923C (describing the "rash of states [that have] rushed to restrict access to abortion .... It is a
striking series of laws, enacted mostly by men, that seek legal control over women's bodies. I
happen to agree with Representative Janet Long of Florida, who said on Friday that you should
'stand down if you don't have ovaries."').
178.
Johnsen, supra note 96, at 261; see Erik Eckholm, New Laws in 6 States Ban Abortions
After 20 Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2011, at Al0 (citing "fetal pain," despite the lack of scientific
support); see also Samuels, supra note 69.
179.
See supra Part IV.B (describing scope of articles 11 through 14). As noted above, while
CEDAW does not explicitly assure the right to abortion, the Committee has criticized states for
prohibiting it. But see Johnsen, supra note 96, at 258 (noting that while "litigation has served as the
primary and most effective weapon against dangerous abortion restrictions .... [a] Court-centered
strategy for the coming decades would be dangerously inadequate").
180.
See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (striking down
Massachusetts's law on Burma as incompatible with federal law). As noted earlier, this assumes the
ratification of the treaty in good faith. See supra Part IV.C.I. Since the Medellin fiasco in 2008,
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008), in which Texas refused to accede to then-President George
W. Bush's request to stay an execution, leaving the United States in violation of international law,
"good faith" requires either language in the transmittal letter indicating that the treaty is "selfexecuting;" see Carlos Manuel Vhzquez, Treaties As Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and
the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008) (explaining why the
presumption that treaties are self-executing endures after Medellin); ratification as a congressionalexecutive agreement, see Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of
InternationalLawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236 (2008); or federal legislation
having the same effect. Id.
181.

See supra Part I.C.
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between male and female wage earners here until women have children. 182
Historically, American women have paid the price in the form of weakened
labor force attachment. Women are now the majority in the workforce,
however, and they are also better educated than men. 183 Patterns are
changing.
Researchers describe two distinct trends. Women without a four-year
college degree are not waiting to marry before having children. As a recent
front-page headline announced, Unwed Mothers Now a Majority Before Age

of 30.184 These women see little advantages to marriage, which may well
make them ineligible for the few benefits, such as food stamps and child
care credit, otherwise available to mothers. 185
Women with four-year college degrees, in contrast, "overwhelmingly
However, even among educated young
marry before having children."
couples, who can afford services like nannies and high quality pre-school,
someone has to find and coordinate a patchwork of private options. Their
counterparts in Germany and France do not. 187 This puts young Americans
at a competitive disadvantage in an increasingly global marketplace.
CEDAW requires state support for reproductive rights and reproductive
work, for men as well as women. As Ginsburg pointed out forty years ago,
this matters for men as well as for women. As explained in the next section,
it has never mattered more for American men.
3. The End of Men?18 8
Rosin argues that "thinking and communicating have come to eclipse
physical strength and stamina as the keys to economic success." 89 As she
notes, "three-quarters of the 8 million jobs lost were lost [during the Great
Recession] by men. The worst-hit industries were overwhelmingly male and
deeply identified with macho: construction, manufacturing, high finance." 1 90

182.

Id.

183.

Rosin, supranote 7, at 3.

184.
Jason DeParle & Sabrina Tavernise, For Women Under 30, Most Births Occur Outside
Marriage,N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/18/us/for-women-under30-most-births-occur-outside-marriage.html?pagewanted=all ("The fatest growth in the last two
decades has occurred among white women in their 20s ....
185.

Id.

186.

Id.

187.

See Miranda,supra note 26 (describing state support of infant and early childcare).

188.

Rosin, supranote 7.

189.

Id.

190.

Id.
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Like Ginsburg's plaintiffs, these men are the casualties of an outmoded
sex/gender system. 1 Like them, these men need support. Their
employment prospects are dim: "[m]en dominate just two of the 15 job
categories projected to grow the most over the next decade: janitor and
computer engineer. Women have everything else-nursing, home health
assistance, child care, food preparation."l92 While women eagerly take jobs
once reserved for men, 19 3 men remain reluctant to take jobs traditionally
held by women. Like many gender issues, this is overdetermined. 194 Some
of these jobs require social intelligence that they lack. 195 Others require
bachelor's degrees, almost 60 percent of which are now awarded to
women. 196 The most intractable factor may be that they are perceived as
"female" jobs. Men view them as "unmanly." 1 97
CEDAW confronts these perceptions head-on by barring the
reproduction of gender. 198 For men like Ginsburg's plaintiffs,1 9 9 CEDAW
affirms caregiving work. 200 For men who have shied away from such work
because of its perceived stigma, CEDAW might encourage them to take
advantage of state-supported family leave, for example, or flex-time. 20 1
191.

See Rubin, supranote 11.

192.

Rosin, supra note 7.

193.
Women now hold 51.4% of managerial and professional jobs, and 45% of the associate
positions in law firms. Id. Even sixty-five years ago, American women went to work in the factories
when American men went off to fight in World War II. See RUTH MILKMAN, GENDER AT WORK:
THE DYNAMICS OF JOB SEGREGATION BY SEX DURING WORLD WAR 11 (1987) (explaining how
women were encouraged to work in factories during World War 11 to replace the men in the
military).
194.

See supra Part II.A.

195.

Rosin, supra note 7.

196.

Id.

197.

See supra text accompanying note 18.

198.
As Franklin notes, the benefits for men of the eradication of gender stereotypes have long
been recognized in Sweden. See Franklin, supra note 2, at 97. American feminists, including Justice
Ginsburg, quickly grasped the significance of this argument. See id.
199.
See, e.g., Franklinsupra note 2, at 104-05. This would include the growing numbers of
single fathers in this country, see NANCY E. DOWD, REDEFINING FATHERHOOD (2000), as well as the
growing numbers of married fathers assuming caregiving responsibilities. See also James
Poniewozik, Up All Night, Modern Family and TV's Feminism for Men, TIME (Nov. 17, 2011),
entertainment.time.com/2011/11/17/up-all-night-modem-family-and-tvs-feminism-for-men/
(noting
the show's efforts to convey "the complexity of [the new father's] position: He made the decision to
stay at home while his wife worked willingly and without drama, and he knows that there can still be
stigma and awkwardness around stay-at-home dads-yet he can't help carrying some of that same
baggage").
200.
201.
2010),

See supra Part 111.B.
See Katrin Bennhold, Working Pan-Time in the 21st Century, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/30/world/europe/30iht-dutch3O.html?pagewanted=all
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CEDAW, over time, might allow even the diehards to tackle pink collar
jobs. 20 2 It might encourage children, including the majority of American
children who are now being raised in "non-traditional families,"203 to take a
more relaxed approach to gender in general.204 CEDAW, in sum, would
build on developments already well underway.2 05
V. CONCLUSION

As I have explained elsewhere, Justice Ginsburg's early antistereotyping work has been rediscovered by a new generation of scholars.
This Article has explained why, as Ginsburg herself has recognized, antistereotyping is only the beginning.206
Part I explained how gender stereotypes are perpetuated, and the
consequences for men, women, and the societies in which they live. Part II
analyzed the limitations of the Constitution in this context, specifically in its
failure to recognize women's rights, including their reproductive rights, as
well as its failure to recognize economic rights of women. Because of these
lacunae, the Constitution cannot effectively be used to address and combat
gender stereotypes. Part III showed how CEDAW can be used to addres and
combat gender stereotypes, and further demonstrated why CEDAW is as
necessary for American men as it is for American women.
Finally, this Article has drawn on The End of Men to explain the

(quoting Remco Vermaire, the youngest partner at his high-powered law firm, "'[w]orking four days
a week is now the rule rather than the exception among my friends,' said Mr. Vermaire, the [firm's]
first [lawyer] to take a 'daddy day' in 2006. Within a year, all the other male lawyers with small
children in his firm had followed suit."); Rosin, supra note 7 (noting that, "[flor recent college
graduates of both sexes, flexible arrangements are at the top of the list of workplace demands,
according to a study published last year in the HarvardBusiness Review.").
202.

See supra text accompanying notes 188-95.

203.
JUDITH STACEY, IN THE NAME OF THE FAMILY: RETHINKING FAMILY VALUES IN THE
POSTMODERN AGE 1, 9 (1996).
204.
See Canning & White, supra note 17 (noting that "pink is in" for young boys); Jennifer
Conlin, The Freedom to Choose Your Pronoun, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/02/fashion/choosing-a-pronoun-he-she-or-other-aftercurfew.html?_r-l& (describing American teenagers who view gender as a choice).
205.
See Franklin, supra note 2 (describing feminist activism in the 1970s). More recently,
American scholars such as Nancy Levit and Nancy Dowd have set out the benefits of "feminism for
men." Nancy Levit, Feminismfor Men: Legal Ideology and the Constructionof Maleness, 43 UCLA
L. REV. 1037 (1996) (discussing how gender stereotypes harm men); see, e.g., DOWD, supra note
199 (explaining how men have been excluded or marginalized in connection with nurturing work);
Kyle Spencer, What's New at the PTA, Dad?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/02/19/fashion/fathers-Shift-the-Dynamics-of-the-PTA.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0
(noting
burgeoning participation of fathers in PTAs nationwide).
206.

See Law & Versteeg, supra note 5.
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"economic and cultural power shift from men to women." 20 7 The sexual
division of labor,208 widely viewed as "natural" only forty years ago, 209is
increasingly recognized as an anachronism, for men as well as for women,
as Ginsburg insisted even then.

207.

See Rosin, supra note 7.

208.

See supra text accompanying note 8.

209.

See, e.g., Bartlett,supra note 18.

